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DEATH IN THE FEDERAL COURTS: EXPECTATIONS AND
REALITIES OF THE FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY ACT OF
1994
I. INTRODUCTION
"Thou shalt not kill."' These four words have echoed
throughout the churches, judicial courts, and political meeting
places of men and women for time immemorial. Along with
their deep religious and political significance, they carry with
them a haunting contrast to the current state of mankind: men
and women can kill other men and women-legally. In the
United States, this "legal" killing, commonly referred to as the
"death penalty," traditionally takes place within the confines of
the individual state judicial systems,2 and generally involves
the execution of felons tried and convicted of some form of
intentional murder.3
However, under the United States Code, the federal govern-
ment also has authority to seek the death penalty for defen-
dants accused of certain crimes within federal court jurisdic-
tion.4 While this authority has existed since the inception of
the republic,5 it was vastly expanded with the codification of
1. Exodus 20:13.
2. There were, as of February, 1996, 2,800 state death row inmates--compared
to eight federal death row inmates. See W. Zachary Malinowski, 5 RI. Murder Sus-
pects May Face Death Penalty, Atty. Gen. Reno to Decide What Penalty to Seek, PROV-
EDENCE J.-BULL., Feb. 19, 1996, at Al. While the overall number of death row in-
mates has gone up consistently since February, 1996, the gap between state and fed-
eral death row inmates remains cavernous. See, e.g., David A. Kaplan, Life and Death
Decisions, NEWSWEEK, June 16, 1997, at 28 (noting that there are "now more than
3,000" total people on death row, "only 12 [of which are] federal inmates"); Eric
Pooley, Death or Life? McVeigh Could Be the Best Argument for Executions, but His
Case Highlights the Problems That Arise When Death Sentences Are Churned Out in
Huge Numbers, TIME, June 16, 1997, at 31 (explaining that there are "more than
3,000 people on death row").
3. See Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 157-58 (1987).
4. See generally Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub.
L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (federal death penalty provisions codified in scattered
sections of 18 U.S.C.).
5. See infra notes 23-28 and accompanying text.
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the Federal Death Penalty Act of 19946 (the "Act", the "1994
Act", the "Death Penalty Act", or the "Federal Death Penalty
Act") as part of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforce-
ment Act of 1994.'
Largely in response to the American public's desire to expand
and expedite the use of the death penalty for violent crimes,8
as evidenced by recent public outrage over drug-related killings
and terrorist acts,' the 1994 Congress, by a vote of three to
one," increased the number of federal crimes potentially in-
voking a death sentence to sixty." This significant expansion
of the federal death penalty increased demands by supporting
lawmakers and other proponents to try violent criminals under
the new federal law.' The United States Attorneys General
responded, reviewing 243 cases for federal death penalty eligi-
bility since the 1994 expansion and recommending sixty-nine of
the 243 for actual capital prosecution"S-twelve of which ulti-
mately led to imposition of a death sentence. 4
Despite the substantial number of federal prosecutions invok-
ing provisions of the Act," however, the Act's legal sufficiency
6. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3591-3598 (1994).
7. Pub. L. No. 102-322, 108 Stat. 1796.
8. Cf Faye A. Silas, The Death Penalty-The Comeback Picks Up Speed, 71-Apr.
A.B.A. J. 48, 48 (1985) (asserting that public support for the death penalty is "at its
highest level in half a century"); see also infra Part V.
9. See Roberto Suro, How a Federal Case Becomes a Capital Case; Secret Panel
Must Weigh Legal Issues, Cost of Prosecution and Public Demands for Vengeance,
WASH. POST, Jan. 11, 1998, at A14.
10. See Dozens of Death Penalties, WASH. POST, Apr. 18, 1994, at A18 (discussing
Congressional voting on the Act).
11. See Henry J. Reske, A Bigger Role For The Feds: 60 Offenses Now Eligible for
Death Penalty Under Bill, 80 A.B.A. J. 14 (1994) (stating that the Federal Death
Penalty Act increases the number of federal crimes possibly bringing a death penalty
sanction to 60); David Johnston & Steven A. Holmes, Experts Doubt Effectiveness of
Crime Bill, N.Y. TMS, Sep. 14, 1994, at A16.
12. See Suro, supra note 9, at A14; cf Pooley, supra note 2, at 31 (describing the
anxiousness of both survivors and the general public to have Timothy McVeigh prose-
cuted under the Federal Death Penalty).
13. See Suro, supra note 9, at A14. In 1997 alone, of the 136 cases considered, 32
were approved for federal death penalty prosecution. See id.
14. See Death Penalty Information Center, Federal Death Row Prisoners (last
modified Mar. 26, 1998) <http://www.essential.org/dpic/fedprisoners.html> (listing cur-
rent federal death row prisoners sentenced under the 1994 Act).
15. The recent high profile prosecution of Timothy McVeigh in the Oklahoma City
bombing trial, discussed infra Part IV.C, is one such prosecution.
FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY ACT
remains relatively untested. Only one federal appellate circuit
has issued an opinion in a case arising under the Act, 6 and
the Supreme Court has not yet addressed the application and
constitutionality of the Act's controversial provisions. 7
Furthermore, it remains unclear whether the new law will
actually result in a surge of executions by the federal govern-
ment. 8 Typical state death penalty appeals take years to
reach fruition, and federal death penalty appeals may suffer
this same prolonged fate. 9 Money may also hinder the Act's
ultimate effect. Given the nature of capital prosecutions and the
lengthy appeals process, death penalty cases usually cost mil-
lions of dollars more than those where life imprisonment is
sought.20
Nevertheless, by expanding and codifying the ultimate crimi-
nal sanction at the federal level, the Death Penalty Act has
significantly influenced the ongoing legal debate regarding judi-
cially sanctioned killing. As a result, its ramifications should
profoundly effect the use of the death penalty in the United
States during the twenty-first century.
This comment surveys the background of the Federal Death
Penalty Act of 1994 and evaluates its effect, so far, on the fed-
eral court system-emphasizing its use in recent federal cases.
Part HI provides a brief evolutionary history of the federal death
penalty, culminating in the passage of the Federal Death Penal-
16. See United States v. Jones, 132 F.3d 232 (5th Cir. 1998) (affirming sentence
of death).
17. See Peyton Robinson, Judge Over Jury: Judicial Discretion in the Federal
Death Penalty Under the Drug Kingpin Act, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 1491, 1492-93 (1996);
see also Tom Kenworthy & Lois Romano, Jury Condemns McVeigh to Death; 'It's
Okay,' Oklahoma Bomber Whispers to Family in Court, WASH. POST, June 14, 1997,
at Al.
18. See George Kannar, Federalizing Death, 44 BuFF. L. REv. 325, 329 (1996); see
also Johnston & Holmes, supra note 11, at A16.
19. See Jack Douglas, Jr. & Ginger D. Richardson, Appeals Could Tie Up Case
for Years, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, June 3, 1997, at 19 (noting that "[the ap-
peals process in federal death penalty cases] is a very frustrating process with a lot
of twists and turns" and the death penalty is "not a very swift and sure kind of
punishmen") (statement of Richard Dieter, Executive Director of the Death Penalty
Information Center in Washington, D.C.).
20. See Suro, supra note 9, at A14 (explaining that the federal government will
have to invest far more resources in typical death penalty cases than it does in life
imprisonment cases).
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ty Act in 1994. Part III profiles the Federal Death Penalty Act
itself, highlighting the individual provisions and the Congressio-
nal efforts made to comply with constitutional requirements.
Part IV analyzes the judicial scrutiny of the Act in recent feder-
al death penalty cases, focusing on two of the most significant
prosecutions under the Act to date. Finally, Part V highlights
the overwhelming support for the death penalty in the United
States, concluding that the Federal Death Penalty Act repre-
sents the will of the people and serves an important role in
American criminal jurisprudence.
II. THE ROOTS OF THE FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY ACT OF 1994
Capital punishment has been part of the American penal
system for over three centuries.2 Dating back to the Massa-
chusetts Bay Colony in 1636, early death penalty offenses in-
cluded idolatry, witchcraft, blasphemy, murder, assault in sud-
den anger, sodomy, buggery, adultery, statutory rape, rape,
manstealing, perjury in a capital trial, and rebellion.'m
In 1790, the First Congress of the United States enacted
legislation providing death as the penalty for certain specified
federal crimes.' Acceptance of the death penalty by the
Founding Fathers is also apparent from the actual text of the
Constitution.' The Fifth Amendment, adopted in 1791, specifi-
cally acknowledges the continued existence of capital punish-
ment by imposing limits on the prosecution in capital cases,'
mandating that:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital ... crime,
unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Ju-
ry ... ; nor shall any person be subject for the same
21. A complete chronological history of the American death penalty is beyond the
scope of this comment. Readers interested in an exceptionally thorough historical
account of capital punishment in the United States should see Furman v. Georgia,
408 U.S. 238, 335-42 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring), and Sandra R. Acosta, Impos-
ing the Death Penalty Upon Drug Kingpins, 27 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 596 (1990).
22. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 335 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring).
23. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 177 (1976) (plurality opinion) (citing C. 9,
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offen[s]e to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb;.., nor
be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law ....
The Fourteenth Amendment, ratified in 1868, "similarly con-
templates the existence of the capital sanction in providing that
no State shall deprive any person of 'ife, liberty, or property'
without due process of law."27
The historical evidence suggests, therefore, that the death
penalty was contemplated by the Framers at both the state and
federal levels; and for nearly two centuries after the initial
federal capital punishment legislation and the enactment of the
Fifth Amendment, the Supreme Court "repeatedly and often
expressly... recognized that capital punishment is not inval-id." 2s
Yet, actual federal death sentences do not have a significant-
ly extensive historical background; the number of verdicts, and
subsequent executions, at the federal level are exceedingly out-
numbered by those handed down in the states.29 During the
twentieth century, only thirty-four people have been executed
by the federal government.0 The most recent federal execution
took place on March 15, 1963, when a twenty-eight-year-old
convicted kidnapper, Victor H. Feguer, was hanged in Iowa.3
26. U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added).
27. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 177 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1).
28. Id. at 177-78. For cases supporting this proposition, but beyond the scope of
this comment, see generally Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (plurality opinion),
Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947), In re Kemmler, 136 U.S.
436 (1890), and Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1878).
29. See Kannar, supra note 18, at 329.
30. See id.; Kaplan, supra note 2, at 28.
31. See Johnston & Holmes, supra note 11, at A16; see also Kannar, supra note
18, at 329. Feguer's case was appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit, Feguer v. United States, 302 F.2d 214 (8th Cir. 1962), where then-
Judge Harry Blaekmun, who later repudiated the use of the death penalty as a mem-
ber of the United States Supreme Court, see generally Randall Coyne, Marking the
Progress of a Humane Justice; Harry Blackmun's Death Penalty Epiphany, 43 U. KAN.
L. REV. 367 (1995), wrote the affirming opinion. See Feguer, 302 F.2d at 255.
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In contrast, the states have executed 443 people since 1976, in-
cluding twenty-nine in the first five months of 1998 alone. 2
This discrepancy is due in part to the lack of a cohesive and
cumulative federal death penalty statute prior to 1994.
A. Opposition to the Death Penalty Mounts
In 1972, in the landmark case of Furman v. Georgia,' the
Supreme Court of the United States declared the death penalty,
as it was applied throughout the United States at the time,
unconstitutional.' At the time the Supreme Court heard the
case in 1972, forty-one states, the District of Columbia, and the
federal government all authorized the death penalty for at least
one crime.35 The approaches taken by the various states and
the federal government differed significantly. Overall, however,
murder was the crime most frequently punished by death, fol-
lowed by kidnapping and treason; 6 rape was punishable by
death in sixteen states and in the federal scheme.
Of the forty-one states with death penalty provisions in effect
when Furman reached the Supreme Court, New Mexico, New
York, North Dakota, Rhode Island, and Vermont all severely
restricted the imposition of the death penalty.38 For example,
in 1967, New York downscaled its capital punishment provision,
authorizing the death penalty for only two crimes: murder of a
police officer and murder by a prisoner serving a life term. 9
The restrictions maintained by the other four states were also
codified during the same general time span, between 1960 and
1972, all within twelve years of the Furman decision." Nine
32. See Death Penalty Information Center, Total Since 1976: 461 (visited May 26,
1998) <http'//www.essential.org/dpic/dpicexec.html>.
33. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
34. See generally id. This case will be discussed in more detail in Part il.B. of
this comment.
35. See id. at 341 (Marshall, J., concurring).
36. See id.
37. See id.
38. See id. at 341 n.79.
39. See id. at 341 n.78.
40. See id. at 341 n.79.
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states at the time, Alaska, Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, Michigan,
Minnesota, Oregon, West Virginia, and Wisconsin, prohibited
capital punishment altogether.4'
Yet, the elimination of the death penalty by the Furman
Court does not account for the absence of federal executions
between 1963 and 1972. There is not one political, judicial, or
social factor to account for the lack of executions at the federal
level after the Feguer hanging but prior to Furman. In analyz-
ing the variables that may have contributed to this void, it is
important to first acknowledge that nine years is a short
stretch of time-especially since the federal government, in
comparison to the states, rarely executed prisoners to begin
with.42 Nevertheless, the changing sentiment of the American
people with regard to the death penalty, as evidenced by the
number of states downscaling their death penalty statutes dur-
ing the twelve years prior to Furman, probably had a prolific
effect on the lack of federal executions. Congress certainly took
notice of the increasingly apparent national interest in modify-
ing capital punishment. In 1967, for example, a Senate bill was
introduced to abolish capital punishment for all federal crimes,
but it died in committee.'
Also, a careful scrutiny of the historical time period in the
several years prior to Furman, while beyond the scope of this
comment, reveals that the foreign and domestic political up-
heaval during the 1960s and early 1970s in the United States
may have played a role in distracting the federal judiciary from
carrying its death penalty cases to fruition. Most likely, howev-
er, all of these factors contributed to effecting a change in the
way that many Americans, the federal government, and the
federal judiciary perceived the death penalty.
As resistance to the death penalty mounted at the state and
federal level in the years leading up to Furman, the question of
whether or not capital punishment was constitutional became
ripe for Supreme Court interpretation. Aside from moral and
religious issues, some of the arguments propounded by death
41. See id at 341 n.79.
42. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
43. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 34041 (Marshall, J., concurring).
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penalty reformists and abolitionists during this important time
in American death penalty jurisprudence" included the follow-
ing: (1) the death penalty was an ineffective deterrent to
crime;4 5 (2) the death penalty was discriminatorily applied
against African-Americans and other minorities, i.e., a
disproportionately high percentage of death row inmates were
members of minority groups;4 6 (3) jurors opposing the death
penalty in general were often dismissed during voir dire evalua-
tions-leaving prosecution-friendly jurors;4 7 (4) there was a
risk of putting convicted felons to death later found to be inno-
cent; s and (5) the death penalty negated the possibility of re-
habilitation.49
In contrast, advocates of the death penalty claimed that,
among other things: (1) the threat of the death penalty did
serve as a deterrent to violent crime;" (2) capital punishment
was favored by the majority of American citizens as a way of
properly punishing murderers;5' and (3) death was the only
just penalty for murderers." In his concurring opinion in
Furman, Justice Marshall outlined and discussed many of the
arguments for and against the death penalty sanction," begin-
ning his evaluation with a list of the "six purposes conceivably
served by capital punishment: retribution, deterrence, preven-
tion of repetitive criminal acts, encouragement of guilty pleas
and confessions, eugenics, and economy."' Despite the fact
Marshall concluded in his Furman concurrence that capital
punishment, as applied, was unconstitutional, 5 his list of con-
ceivable purposes provides a solid foundation for understanding
arguments propounded by death penalty advocates.
56
44. Many of these arguments are still used by abolitionists today. See generally
Silas, supra note 8, at 49; Pooley, supra note 2, at 31.
45. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 353-54 (Marshall, J., concurring).
46. See Silas, supra note 8, at 49.
47. See id.
48. See i&.
49. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 346 (Marshall, J., concurring).
50. See Silas, supra note 8, at 49.
51. See id.
52. See id
53. See generally Furman, 408 U.S. at 342-58 (Marshall, J., concurring).
54. Id. at 342.
55. See id. at 369-70.
56. The purpose of mentioning Marshall's analysis here is to afford the reader a
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By 1972, the battle lines between the two sides of the death
penalty debate were drawn. In Furman, the Supreme Court
"issued its first major statement on the subject."5"
B. Setting Constitutional Roadblocks
The Supreme Court's holding in Furman provided a major
political and moral victory for death penalty abolitionists. In a
5-4 decision, the Court announced that, based on the Georgia,
Florida, and Texas death penalty statutes,58 the imposition
and implementation of the death penalty constituted cruel and
unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments.59 The Court reasoned that the state sentencing
provisions in question lacked necessary procedural safeguards
designed to guide the sentencing authority's discretion in order
to prevent arbitrary imposition of the death sanction.' Be-
cause none of the other capital punishment statutes in effect
throughout the country at the time of the decision contained
such procedural safeguards, the decision essentially rendered all
death penalty statutes unconstitutional."' Justice Douglas most
eloquently summarized the Court's sentiment in his concurring
opinion, explaining that "[the high service rendered by the 'cru-
el and unusual' punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment is
to require legislatures to write penal laws that are evenhanded,
better understanding of death penalty proponent arguments during the relevant time
period. Compilation of his list of six conceivable purposes for the death penalty re-
salted from enormous amounts of historical and empirical research. See generally id.
at 340-59.
57. Silas, supra note 8, at 50.
58. Of the three cases before the Court, one involved imposition of the death
penalty for murder (Georgia); the other two were rape cases culminating in death
sentences (Texas, Florida).
59. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 240 (Douglas, J., concurring).
60. See Paul D. Kamenar, Death Penalty Legislation for Espionage and Other Fed-
eral Crimes is Unnecessary: It Just Needs a Little Re-Enforcement, 24 WAKE FoREsT
L. REV. 881, 881 (1989) (describing the Furman Court's rationale regarding the sen-
tencing schemes of the statutes in question).
61. See Neff C. Schur, Assessing the Constitutionality and Policy Implications of
the 1994 Drug Kingpin Death Penalty, 2 TEL F. ON C.L. & C.R. 141, 143 (1996)
(suggesting the Furman decision declared all state death penalty statutes unconstitu-
tional).
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nonselective, and nonarbitrary, and to require judges to see to
it that general laws are not applied sparsely, selectively, and
spottily .... 6
2
All nine Justices in Furman filed separate opinions. Of the
five concurring opinions, only Justices Brennan and Marshall
found capital punishment unconstitutional per se.' They fo-
cused on the cruel and unusual punishment doctrine of the
Eighth Amendment." However, "[tihree other concurring Jus-
tices were concerned that unfettered jury discretion in imposing
the death penalty led to its arbitrary [and capricious] exer-
cise."' The dissenters, Justices Burger, Blackmun, Powell, and
Rehnquist, emphasized that the death penalty was neither
repugnant nor condemnable by modern civilized standards. 8
They urged deference to legislative interpretation for the most
reliable indicators of contemporary values,67 concluding that
capital punishment was not unconstitutional per se.'
Despite the split, the decision effectively abolished the death
penalty in the United States, overturning death penalty laws on
the books in the forty-one states and the federal government.
Ultimately, it "saved the lives" of at least 600 inmates through-
out the United States awaiting execution."9
62. Furman, 408 U.S. at 256 (Douglas, J., concurring).
63. See id. at 305 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 370-72 (Marshall, J., concur-
ring); see also Kamenar, supra note 60, at 892 (Only "Justice Brennan [and Justice
Marshall] concluded . .. that the [E]ighth [A]mendment prohibits capital punishment
in all cases.").
64. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 305 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 370-72 (Mar-
shall, J., concurring).
65. Lori Searcy & Laurel E. Shanks, Capital Punishment, 85 GEO. L.J. 1430,
1430 n.2346 (1997); see Furman, 408 U.S. at 256-57 (Douglas, J., concurring); id at
309 (Stewart, J., concurring); id at 313 (White, J., concurring).
66. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 385 (Burger, C.J., Blackmun, Powell & Rehnquist,
JJ., dissenting) ("[The death penalty] is not a punishment such as burning at the
stake that everyone would ineffably find to be repugnant to all civilized standards.").
67. See id& at 385 ("In looking for reliable indicia of contemporary attitude [about
capital punishment], none more trustworthy [than individual legislatures] has been
advanced."); Searcy and Shanks, supra note 65, at 1430 n.2346.
68. See Furman, 418 U.S. at 375 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 405 (Blackmun,
J., dissenting); id. at 414 (Powell, J., dissenting); id. at 465 (Rehnquist, J., dissent-
ing).
69. Silas, supra note 8, at 50.
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The abolitionists won a major battle in the war to have the
death penalty permanently abrogated. In reality, however, the
war itself was far from won. In reaction to the Supreme Court's
decision in Furman, thirty-five states,0 including Georgia,
Florida, and Texas,71 scrambled to rewrite their death penalty
laws-hoping for another shot at Supreme Court interpreta-
tion.72 Four years after Furman, in Gregg v. Georgia,' the
Supreme Court reviewed Georgia's rewritten death penalty stat-
ute. Much to the chagrin of abolitionists, the Court ruled that
the punishment of death for the crime of murder did not, under
all circumstances, violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments.74 More specifically, in finding that the new Georgia
statutory system was constitutional, the court concluded that
the concerns expressed in Furman that the penalty of death
not be imposed in an arbitrary or capricious manner can be
met by a carefully drafted statute that ensures that the
sentencing authority is given adequate information and
guidance. As a general proposition these concerns are best
met by a system that provides for a bifurcated proceeding
at which the sentencing authority is apprised of the infor-
mation relevant to the imposition of sentence and provided
with standards to guide its use of the information.'
Georgia's rewritten statute, according to the Court, satisfied
the concerns in Furman by specifying aggravating and mitigat-
ing circumstances, requiring automatic appeal of all death sen-
tences to the Georgia Supreme Court, and mandating compari-
sons of death sentences with those sentences imposed on simi-
larly situated defendants.7" In sum, the interpretation of the
death penalty handed down by the Gregg Court required stat-
utes to be rewritten so as to mandate: (1) guided discretion in
sentencing on the part of both the judge and jury; (2) the con-
70. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179-80 (1976) (plurality opinion).
71. See id. at 179 n.23.
72. Cf id. at 180.
73. 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (plurality opinion).
74. See id. at 169. Clarifying this point even further, the Court said that "the
death penalty is not a form of punishment that may never be imposed, regardless of
the circumstances of the offense, regardless of the character of the offender, and re-
gardless of the procedure followed in reaching the decision to impose it." Id at 187.
75. Id. at 195. See generally id at 187-95.
76. See id. at 196-98.
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sideration of aggravating and mitigating circumstances; and (3)
the conduct of two trials-one for the determination of guilt,
and another for sentencing."
Many states immediately modified their death penalty stat-
utes to meet the new requirements. In contrast, after Furman
and Gregg were announced, but prior to 1994, the federal gov-
ernment made only one attempt to constitutionally reformulate
its own outdated death penalty scheme.78 This first post-Gregg
federal attempt at constitutional compliance occurred in 1988
when Congress passed the Drug Kingpin Act79 (the "1988 Act",
the "Kingpin Act", or the "Drug Kingpin Act") as part of the
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988.0
C. The First Federal Attempt at Compliance-Haste Makes
Waste
The Drug Kingpin Act authorized the federal death penalty
for certain drug-related murders.8 Specifically, it codified the
death penalty sanction for any defendant, while working as
part of a criminal enterprise, that intentionally kills, counsels,
commands, procures, induces or causes the intentional killing of
an individual 2 or law enforcement officer."3 "Criminal enter-
prise" is defined in the 1988 Act as an organization used for
drug-related felonies, with five or more people, where an indi-
vidual acts as the supervisor or manager and derives substan-
tial income or resources from that position."M Juries are al-
77. See Silas, supra note 8, at 50.
78. See Kannar, supra note 18, at 326. One set of authors referred to these un-
disturbed federal death penalty statutes, rendered useless after Furman, as 'zombie"
statutes. See RANDALL CoYNE & LYN ENTZEROTH, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE
JUDICIAL PROCESS 683 (1994).
79. 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1994).
80. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181.
81. See 21 U.S.C. § 848(e) (1994).
82. See id. § 848(e)(1)(A).
83. See id. § 848(eX1)(B). A law enforcement officer is defined as "a public ser-
vant authorized by law or by a Government agency or Congress to conduct or engage
in the prevention, investigation, prosecution or adjudication of an offense, and in-
cludes those engaged in corrections, probation, or parole functions." Id. § 848(eX2).
84. See id § 848(c).
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lowed full discretion in deciding whether to sentence a defen-
dant involved in such a criminal enterprise to death.s5
The legislative history behind the 1988 bill shows that Con-
gress aimed the death penalty provisions specifically at
triggermen and drug lords from whom the triggermen received
their orders." During Congressional debate, Senator Alfonse
D'Amato articulated this rationale, stating that the Kingpin Act
"say[s] very carefully that if you are involved in giving orders
to take another life ... or if you execute that order, that you
may be charged with appropriate punishment which can be the
death penalty."7 The story behind the law's nickname lends
credence to this legislative intention. While there can be no
doubt that the law was designed to incorporate all criminal
enterprise members," Congress directed one section specifically
against the leaders or "kingpins" of criminal enterprises, target-
ing "the principal administrator, organizer, or leader of the
enterprise 89-- hence, the name Drug "Kingpin" Act.
Regardless of the intentions of its drafters, however, the
Drug Kingpin Act of 1988 "hastily established a new federal
death penalty," neglecting to include anything about the meth-
od, manner, or place for carrying out federal death sentences.'
Besides being impractical, it was a "transparently symbolic"
attempt by Congress to show interest in the federal death pen-
alty during an election year."' A telling example of Congress'
carelessness is evidenced by the fact that an element of the un-
derlying offense in the 1988 Act doubled as an aggravating
circumstance for consideration during sentencing-a "sure way
85. See id. § 848(k).
86. See Brian Serr, Of Crime and Punishment, Kingpins, and Footsoldiers, Life
and Death: The Drug War and the Federal Death Penalty Provision-Problems of
Interpretation and Constitutionality, 25 ARIz. ST. L.J. 895, 914 (1993) (explaining that
there is an abundance of legislative history showing Congress intended the Drug
Kingpin Act for use against triggermen and their bosses).
87. 134 CONG. REC. S7416 (daily ed. June 8, 1988) (statement of Sen. D'Amato).
88. See 21 U.S.C. § 848(a) ("Any person who engages in a continuing criminal
enterprise shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment ...
89. See id. § 848(bX1).
90. Kannar, supra note 18, at 326.
91. See id.
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of guaranteeing that at least one 'aggravating circumstance' is
going to be found in every case in which a conviction is re-
turned."92
The empirical evidence to date casts even further doubt on
the practicality of the Drug Kingpin Act. Between 1988 and
May, 1995, the law had been approved for use in only forty-six
cases, at a rate of approximately six or seven a year. 3 As of
March, 1998, a total of merely six people had been sentenced to
death under the 1988 Act, none of which have actually been
executed.'M In addition, the limited scope of the law, narrowly
confined to penalizing drug-related murderers, raised concerns
about its overall effectiveness. 5 Six years would pass before
many of these concerns were addressed by the federal govern-
ment.
In 1994, when Congress finally did address the concerns,
they did so in a powerfully sweeping fashion. As one commenta-
tor noted, the "real 'federalizing death' extravaganza took place
not in 1988 . . . but just prior to the 1994 election, [when Con-
gress passed the Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994], effective
in September of that year."9"
III. THE ACT
Congress designed the Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994 to
accomplish two major objectives." First, it greatly expands the
number of federal crimes potentially invoking a sentence of
death.98 Members of Congress debating the bill placed the
number of new death penalty crimes at sixty.99 Second, it "pro-
92. Id. at 327.
93. See id. at 327 (citing Richard Barbieri, Bombing Suspect's Legal Defense in
Limbo, THE RECORDER, May 2, 1995, at 1).
94. See Death Penalty Information Center, Federal Death Penalty (last modified
Mar. 26, 1998) <http'//www.essential.org/dpic/feddp.html>.
95. Cf Sandra D. Jordan, Death for Drug Related Killings: Revival of the Federal
Death Penalty, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 79, 92 (1991).
96. Kannar, supra note 18, at 328.
97. See Kevin J. Sullivan & Gaela K. Gehring, Capital Punishment, 83 GEO. L.J.
1281, 1308 (1995).
98. See id.
99. See, e.g., 140 CONG REC. S12421-01, S12433 (daily ed. Aug. 24, 1994) (state-
ment of Sen. Kerrey) (stating that there were "about 60" new death penalties). 'It is
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vides a new federal system for sentencing, imposing, and re-
viewing the death [penalty] for certain federal crimes.""®
Oddly, however, the new provisions in the Act contain no
statement of purpose, and there is little insight into legislative
purpose in the Congressional Record beyond the two major ob-
jectives discussed above."0 ' For example, there exists little
substantive discussion on the overall effectiveness, merits, and
morality of the death penalty."2 Instead, members focused on
the procedural aspects of the Act, i.e., the appropriateness of
the number of new death penalty crimes,0 3 and whether the
federal court system was equipped to "handle the influx of
cases under the new provisions.""° Despite these arguably
alarming shortcomings during Congressional debate, President
Clinton signed the Act into law on September 13, 1994."5
A. The New Federal Death Penalty Crimes
The Act dramatically expanded the small base of pre-1994
federal death penalty crimes, including those covered by the
Drug Kingpin Act of 1988. Prior to 1994, according to one
scholar, federal capital punishment statutes in effect could be
categorized one of three ways.' The first category included
non-homicidal crimes, namely treason' and espionage.'08
The second category covered crimes involving precarious human
activity ultimately resulting in death. Included in this category
were kidnapping of high-level government officials where death
indisputable that the quantity of crimes for which the death penalty has been made
available has substantially increased." Charles Kenneth Eldred, The New Federal
Death Penalties, 22 AM. J. CRIM. L. 293, 293 n.2 (1994).
100. See Sullivan & Gehring, supra note 97, at 1308.
101. See Eldred, supra note 99, at 294.
102. See id. at 295.
103. See, e.g., 140 CONG REC. E1807-02 (daily ed. Aug. 21, 1994) (statement of
Rep. LaFalce) ("I believe the slew of new death penalties contained in this bill--over
60-are, to say the least, excessive.").
104. Eldred, supra note 99, at 295; see also 140 CONG. REC. H2322-02, H2325
(daily ed. Apr. 14, 1994) (statement of Rep. Glickman) ("FBI Director Freeh recently
said that [the federal courts] are already understaffed for the current workload. We
are doing them a disservice by adding these ... death penalty offenses.").
105. See Douglas & Richardson, supra note 19, at 19.
106. See Eldred, supra note 99, at 296.
107. See 18 U.S.C. § 2381 (1988).
108. See id. § 794.
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results,'" the destruction of aircraft facilities, motor vehicles,
and motor vehicle facilities resulting in death,"' the wrecking
of a train where death results,"' death resulting from aircraft
hijacking," and the mailing of injurious articles culminating
in death."' The third category of pre-1994 federal capital pun-
ishment provisions encompassed crimes involving the physical
killing of another human being. This category included first
degree murder in federal maritime and special jurisdiction ar-
eas,"4 murder during a bank robbery,"' and murder of high-
level government officials, including the President,"5  Vice
President,"7  members of Congress,"' and Supreme Court
Justices."'
Crimes enacted and amended by the Federal Death Penalty
Act of 1994 fall into only the second and third categories of
those pre-1994 provisions: crimes where some dangerous human
activity ultimately results in death and crimes involving the
actual physical killing of other people. 20
To fully comprehend the complexities and vastness of the Act,
it is important to draw a distinction between the provisions
actually enacted into the United States Code by the Act and
those simply amended. Ten sections were newly enacted, five in
each of the applicable categories. The five capital punishment
crimes enacted in the "physical killing" category are (1) murder
committed during a drug-related drive-by shooting, 2' (2) mur-
der by a federal prisoner under a sentence of life imprison-
ment,"= (3) murder of a United States national by another
109. See id § 1751(b); id. § 351(b).
110. See id. § 34.
111. See id. § 1992.
112. See 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 1472-1473 (1988).
113. See 18 U.S.C. § 1716.
114. See id. § 1111.
115. See id. § 2113 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
116. See id. § 1751(a) (1988).
117. See id.
118. See id. § 351(a).
119. See id.
120. See Eldred, supra note 99, at 296.
121. See 18 U.S.C. § 36 (1994).
122. See id. § 1118.
954
FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY ACT
United States national where the killing occurs in a foreign
nation,' (4) murder by an escaped federal prisoner already
sentenced to life imprisonment,' and (5) murder of a state
official working with federal law enforcement personnel or of a
state correctional officer engaged in transporting the murderer
interstate.'
The five new enactments involving precarious activity result-
ing in death are (1) violent acts at international airports by
United States nationals or persons found in the United
States,' (2) rape or child molestation,' (3) violence against
maritime navigation,' (4) violence against maritime fixed
platforms,' and (5) use of a weapon of mass destruction
against a United States citizen, any person within the United
States, or property owned, leased, or used by the United
States."30
"Physical killing" crimes not enacted, but rather amended by
the Act to potentially invoke the federal death penalty include
the following: carjacking where death results;..' murder in a
federal facility or during an attack on a federal facility; 2
murder of a court officer or juror killed in the course of the
murderer's attempt to influence the victim; murder of a wit-
ness, victim, or informant in retaliation for assisting in law
enforcement;' and first degree murder committed by firing a
weapon into a crowd of two or more people in furtherance of a
crime.1 5
Finally, crime provisions codified as amended by the Act to
invoke the federal death penalty when dangerous human activi-
ty results in death include kidnapping," hostage taking,7
123. See Ud § 1119.
124. See id. § 1120.
125. See i&. § 1121.
126. See / § 37.
127. See i& § 2245.
128. See i- § 2280.
129. See id. § 2281.
130. See id. § 2332a.
131. See id § 2119.
132. See / § 930.
133. See id. § 1503.
134. See id. § 1513.
135. See id. § 36.
136. See id. § 1201.
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alien smuggling,"m genocide,'39 conspiracy against a person's
civil rights,"4 and deprivation of civil rights under color of
law.'4 '
Some commentators, including Congressmen debating the Act,
criticized the inclusion of some of the more obscure provisions,
covering such crimes as murder of a federal poultry inspector,
murder resulting from an attack using firearms on a federal
facility, and genocide.' The provision in the 1994 Act that
may be "the most intriguing," however, is the one in that por-
tion of the 1994 bill establishing federal death penalty imple-
mentation procedures." That section proclaims that:
No employee of any State department of corrections, the
United States Department of Justice, the Federal Bureau of
Prisons, or the United States Marshals Service... shall be
required... to be in attendance at or to participate in any
prosecution or execution under this section if such participa-
tion is contrary to the moral or religious convictions of the
employee.'
This prosecutorial opt-out provision represents an effort "to
establish something like a conscientious objector status for
federal employees vis a vis the new federal death penalty."4 '
The section is intriguing to death penalty observers because it
appears to insert a bit of morality into a statute whose legis-
lative history is extremely secularized.' Allowing federal gov-
ernment officials to opt out of death penalty prosecutions signi-
137. See id. § 1203(a).
138. See id. § 1342.
139. See id. § 1091(b)(1).
140. See id. § 241.
141. See id. § 242.
142. See 140 CONG. REc. S6078-02, S6092 (daily ed. May 19, 1994) (statement of
Sen. D'Amato) ("You are a chicken inspector and you get shot.., or you commit
some exotic crime ... those are not the crimes that are savaging cities."); Johnston
& Holmes, supra note 11, at A16.
143. Kannar, supra note 18, at 331.
144. 18 U.S.C. § 3597(b) (1994).
145. Kannar, supra note 18, at 331-32.
146. Cf id. at 334 (stating that the exception "perhaps sends a little bit of a mes-
sage that the practice of law is to be seen as having at least some modicum of real
moral content").
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fies a faint recognition of the moral issues surrounding the
death penalty by both Congress and other prosecution-minded
members of the legal profession.147
B. Complying with Constitutional Interpretation
Although the Act suffers from potentially significant deficien-
cies with regard to its legislative history," the 103d Congress
appears to have made a genuine effort at drafting a constitu-
tionally valid death penalty statute. Compliance with the con-
stitutional requirements set forth in Gregg guided the imposi-
tion of many of the provisions propounded in the Act.
For example, the Act "actually spells out the manner in
which a federal death sentence is to be implemented.""" One
relevant provision mandates that the prisoner be committed to
the custody of the Attorney General until all appeals are ex-
hausted, at which point he or she is transferred to the care of a
United States Marshal.5 ° The United States Marshal then su-
pervises implementation of the sentence in the manner estab-
lished by the law of the state in which the sentence is im-
posed.'' If the law of the particular sentencing state does not
allow for the death penalty, the court is responsible for desig-
nating another state, the law of which does allow for capital
punishment, to administer the death sentence.'52 In compari-
son, the 1988 Drug Kingpin Act failed to address implementa-
tion matters altogether."
In addition to implementation measures, the Federal Death
Penalty Act dramatically altered other procedural aspects of
carrying out a federal death sentence, requiring the use of state
147. See id at 335. For a fascinating and thorough perspective on this section of
the Federal Death Penalty Act, see id. at 331-36.
148. See supra Part III.
149. Kannar, supra note 18, at 330. This provision of the Act is found in 18
U.S.C. § 3596(a) (1994).
150. See 18 U.S.C. § 3596(a) (1994).
151. See i.
152. See id.
153. See Kannar, supra note 18, at 330.
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facilities'" and the hiring of the local state executioner and
other "appropriate" state officials.155
Miscellaneous provisions scattered throughout the Act simi-
larly reflect Congressional efforts at constitutional compli-
ance." Specifically, it is apparent that Congress sought pre-
vention of discriminatory practices in the overall death sentenc-
ing process.'57 For instance, the Act requires courts to instruct
juries not to consider the sex, race, color, religious beliefs, or
national origin of the defendant or the victim." Furthermore,
the Act exempts from capital punishment pregnant women,"
mentally retarded persons,"8 and persons incapable of under-
standing imposition of the death penalty.'' Finally, to assure
adequate representation, the Act requires appointment of two
counsel to all defendants in capital cases. 62
More important than any of the above mentioned provisions
for successful compliance with the constitutional standards set
forth in Gregg, however, are those governing the use of aggra-
vating and mitigating factors in deciding whether or not a sen-
tence of death is justified. Aggravating and mitigating factors
are taken into account under the new Act at a separate death
penalty hearing."
Before the trial, the aggravating factor(s) must be enumerat-
ed within a notice statement to the defendant alerting the de-
fendant of the prosecution's decision to pursue the death penal-
ty."M Aggravating factors for murder-related death penalties
include, among others, any of the following: death during com-
mission of another crime, previous conviction of a violent felony
involving a firearm, previous conviction of an offense for which
154. See 18 U.S.C. § 3597(a) (1994). The Drug Kingpin Act of 1988 mandated the
use of a federal facility in Indiana.
155. See id.
156. See Sullivan & Gehring, supra note 97 at 1308.
157. See id-
158. See 18 U.S.C. § 3593(f).
159. See id § 3596(b).
160. See id. § 3596(c).
161. See &L
162. See I § 3005.
163. See id. § 3593(b).
164. See id. § 3593(a).
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a sentence of death or life imprisonment was authorized by
statute, grave risk of death to one or more persons in addition
to the victim of the offense, procurement of offense by payment,
pecuniary gain, planning or premeditation, previous conviction
of two or more felony drug offenses, vulnerability of the victim,
previous conviction for serious federal drug offenses, victim's
status as a high public official, and multiple killings or at-
tempted killings.'6
Aggravating factors for imposition of a drug offense death
penalty include the following: previous conviction for serious
drug felony, use of a firearm, distribution of a controlled sub-
stance to persons under twenty-one, distribution of a controlled
substance near schools, and the use of minors in trafficking
controlled substances." The aggravating factors for espionage
and treason are three-fold: (1) prior espionage or treason offens-
es; (2) knowing creation of a grave risk to national security;
and (3) knowing creation of a grave risk of death.'67 A death
sentence can be imposed only after at least one aggravating
factor is proved beyond a reasonable doubt."
A separate sentencing hearing is held before a jury if the
prosecution files a notice, as described above, and the defendant
is subsequently found guilty or pleads guilty." At this hear-
ing, the prosecution may again present information relevant to
any aggravating factors enumerated in the original notice.'
The defendant may counter with information relevant to miti-
gating factors. "' Mitigating factors enumerated in the Act in-
clude any of the following: impaired capacity, duress, minor
participation, equally culpable defendants, lack of prior criminal
record, victim's consent, and any other factors in the
defendant's background that "mitigate against imposition of the
death sentence."'72
165. See id. § 3592(c).
166. See id. § 3592(d).
167. See id. § 3592(b).
168. See id. § 3593(e).
169. See id. § 3593(b).
170. See id. § 3593(c).
171. See id.
172. Id. § 3592(a).
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If the jury fails to find that the prosecution proved at least
one of the statutory aggravating factors beyond a reasonable
doubt, the federal death penalty may not be imposed.' As-
suming, however, the jury does find one statutory aggravating
factor beyond a reasonable doubt, it must then consider that
factor, plus any nonstatutory aggravating factor for which the
prosecution has provided notice,74 and weigh them against
the mitigating factors to determine if capital punishment is
justified.75
The defendant has the burden of proving the existence of any
mitigating factors only by a preponderance of the evidence. 6
Comparatively, as mentioned above, the government must es-
tablish the existence of statutory aggravating factors beyond a
reasonable doubt.'77 Also, mitigating factors can be considered
by one or more jurors regardless of the number of other jurors
who agree the factor has been established;'78 whereas findings
with respect to both statutory and nonstatutory aggravating
factors must be unanimous. 179
With the inclusion of these carefully drafted provisions, the
final version of the Federal Death Penalty Act appeared to
incorporate the necessary safeguards to survive a constitutional
challenge based on the Gregg criteria. However, its fate rested
with the federal courts-and it would not be long before the
courts would get their opportunity to interpret the constitution-
ality of the statute in both routine homicide prosecutions and
national high-profile murder trials.
173. See 18 U.S.C. § 3593(d) (1994); see also United States v. Nguyen, 928 F.
Supp. 1525, 1532 (D. Kan. 1996).
174. See 18 U.S.C. § 3593(d).
175. See id. § 3593(e); see also Nguyen, 928 F. Supp. at 1532.
176. See 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c); see also Nguyen, 928 F. Supp. at 1532.
177. See 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c); see also Nguyen, 928 F. Supp. at 1532.
178. See 18 U.S.C. § 3593(d).
179. See id.
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IV. THE CASES' s°
Orlando Hall and Bruce Webster were the first ever targets
of the new federal death penalty.'' Both men were charged
and sentenced to death under the Act for the September 24,
1994, fatal kidnapping of Arlington, Texas teenager Lisa Re-
ne." Rene was taken from her home, gang-raped, beaten
with a shovel, and buried alive by the two men." Hall and
Webster were successfully prosecuted under the provision of the
Act covering kidnapping resulting in death."8 They have since
been joined by a growing number of other criminal suspects for
whom the federal government is seeking the death penalty.1"
In some of these cases, the Act's constitutionally debatable
provisions have survived close judicial scrutiny.88
A. Early Judicial Treatment of the Act
In United States v. Nguyen,"' the defendant was charged
with using a firearm to commit murder during the course of a
robbery,18 a federal offense under the 1994 Act.'89 The gov-
ernment notified Nguyen that it intended to prove several non-
180. As of this writing, many of the opinions arising under the Federal Death
Penalty Act of 1994 have not yet been published in text or online. Therefore,
whenever appropriate, reliable alternative case information sources are used and cited
accordingly.
181. See Chris Payne, Jury's Still Out on Federal Death Penalty; Views on Recent
Bill Still Vary as Legislation Affects Local Murder Case, DALLAS MORNING NEWS,
June 2, 1996, at 1A. Note that the court opinions for the Webster and Hall cases
were not published at the time of this writing.
182. See Selwyn Crawford, Death Penalty Given; Man Sentenced in Slaying of Girl,
16, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Nov. 7, 1995, at 19A; Chris Payne, Jurors Give Lisa
Rene Killer Death; Panel Confers 10 Hours, Rejects Retardation Claim, DALLAS MORN-
ING NEws, June 20, 1996, at 25A.
183. See Payne, supra note 182, at 25A.
184. See 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (1994); Payne, supra note 182.
185. See Payne, supra note 181, at 1A.
186. See, eg., United States v. Jones, 132 F.3d 232 (5th Cir. 1998); United States
v. Johnson, No. 96CR379, 1997 WL 534163, at *1 (N.D. nM. Aug. 20, 1997); United
States v. McVeigh, 944 F. Supp. 1478 (D. Colo. 1996); United States v. Chanthadara,
928 F. Supp. 1055 (D. Kan. 1996); United States v. Nguyen, 928 F. Supp. 1525 (D.
Kan. 1996).
187. 928 F. Supp. at 1525 (D. Kan. 1996).
188. See id. at 1531.
189. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(i).
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statutory factors at the sentencing phase, namely that (1)
Nguyen participated in an act of violence that demonstrated
reckless disregard for human life, and that the victim died as a
result; (2) Nguyen was not remorseful; (3) Nguyen represented
a lingering threat to the lives and safety of others in the fu-
ture; (4) Nguyen caused permanent harm to the family of the
victim due to the close proximity of the murder to the victim's
husband and two daughters; and (5) Nguyen had little hope for
rehabilitation.9 '
The defendant challenged the constitutionality of these non-
statutory factors, arguing that allowing the government to de-
fine the factors violated the Eighth Amendment because it
could result in arbitrary and capricious sentencing. 9' The
court rejected the challenge, quoting a relevant passage from an
earlier Supreme Court case: "[T]he Constitution does not re-
quire the jury to ignore other possible aggravating factors in
the process of selecting, from among [the class of persons eligi-
ble for the death penalty], those defendants who will actually
be sentenced to death."1
92
Nguyen also attacked the two statutory aggravating factors
alleged against him as unconstitutional.' 93 The government
claimed that (1) Nguyen committed the offense in a heinous,
cruel, or depraved manner in that the crime included torture or
serious physical abuse;' and (2) that he expected pecuniary
gain as a result.9 '
Nguyen first argued that the "heinous, cruel, or depraved"
factor" was broad enough to encompass every first degree
murder and, thus, unconstitutional. 97 The court rejected this
contention, labeling it as an unwarranted extension of the Su-
preme Court's statement in Godfrey v. Georgia,'98 that a "per-
son of ordinary sensibility could fairly characterize almost every
190. See Nguyen, 928 F. Supp. at 1538.
191. See id.
192. Id. (quoting Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 878 (1983) (footnote omitted)).
193. See id. at 1533.
194. See 18 U.S.C. § 3592(c)(6); Nguyen, 928 F. Supp. at 1533.
195. See 18 U.S.C. § 3592(c)(8); Nguyen, 928 F. Supp. at 1533.
196. 18 U.S.C. § 3592(c)(6).
197. See Nguyen, 928 F. Supp. at 1533.
198. 446 U.S. 420 (1980).
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murder as 'outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhu-
man.MM Nguyen further maintained that the same factor was
unconstitutionally vague."® Again, the court dismissed the
challenge, explaining that the modifying language in the statute
furnished guidance for the choice between death and a lesser
penalty.2
1
Finally, Nguyen contended that the "pecuniary gain" aggra-
vating factor2 2 could not be constitutionally applied to his
case because of its ambiguous nature.' The court found noth-
ing at all ambiguous about the language of the provision, pre-
ferring to construe it according to its plain language.'
In United States v. Johnson,"5 one of the defendants, Daryl
Lamont Johnson, sought to strike both the statutory and non-
statutory aggravating factors from the government's notice. The
statutory aggravating factors used by the government were two-
fold: (1) intentional act to take someone's life or use lethal
force;' and (2) substantial planning and premeditation.'
Johnson asserted that the vagueness of the first statutory
aggravating factor violated the Eighth Amendments prohibition
against factors that do not narrow the type of murders eligible
for capital punishment." 8 The applicable provision directs' the
jury to determine whether the defendant "participated in an
act, contemplating that the life of a person would be taken or
intending that lethal force would be used in connection with a
person, other than one of the participants in the offense, and
the victim died as a direct result of the act.' ° The court
199. Nguyen, 928 F. Supp. at 1534 (quoting Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428-
29 (1980) (citation omitted)).
200. See id. at 1533.
201. See id
202. 18 U.S.C. § 3592(cX8) (1994).
203. See Nguyen, 928 F. Supp. at 1534.
204. See id at 1535.
205. No. 96 CR 379, 1997 WL 534163, at *1 (N.D. IMI., Aug. 20, 1997).
206. See 18 U.S.C. § 3591(aX2XC); Johnson, 1997 WL 534163, at *2.
207. See 18 U.S.C. § 3592(cX9); Johnson, 1997 WL 534163, at *2.
208. See Johnson, 1997 WL 534163, at *2.
209. See 18 U.S.C. § 3591(aX2XC).
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found that the explicit instruction to the jury provided more
than adequate guidance to avoid unconstitutional vague-
ness.
210
Regarding the second statutory factor, Johnson argued that
it, too, was vague in failing to narrow the class of murders
subject to death.21 The court abruptly discarded the argu-
ment, asserting that "the terms 'premeditation,' 'planning,' and
'substantial' are not unconstitutionally vague."2"
The court also rejected Johnson's challenges to the following
nonstatutory aggravating factors levied against him: (1) vileness
of the crime; (2) future dangerousness; and (3) victim
impact.1 3 In sum, the court held that the nonstatutory factors
served an "individualizing" function, separate from statutory
factors, but equally constitutional; they were not unconstitution-
ally vague-rather, the "dangerousness" factor was even more
specific than required. The court emphasized that aggravating
factors could constitutionally be part of the underlying of-
fense.214
While it may be difficult to objectively proclaim the Act's
overall "success" 25 at this point in its short history, its codifi-
cation has certainly provided the government with a prosecuto-
rial weapon on par with the Act's legislative cousins in death
penalty states throughout the country. The cases discussed up
to this point provide a general foundation for understanding
early judicial interpretation of the Act and the constitutional
viability of the Act's mandate for the use of aggravating fac-
tors-at least in the lower federal courts. However, the two
cases discussed in Parts IV.A. and IV.B., below, most convinc-
ingly illuminate the expectations and realities of the Federal
Death Penalty Act of 1994 for two reasons. First, both cases are
210. See Johnson, 1997 WL 534163, at *2.
211. See i& at *4.
212. Id. (citations omitted).
213. See id. at *1.
214. See id. at *6 (citations omitted).
215. The word "success" is placed in quotations here because it can have several
different connotations in the context of this comment. For example, one may view the
Act's "success" by: (1) the number of cases prosecuted under the Act; (2) the number
of cases where federal defendants were actually sentenced to die; or (3) the accep-
tance of the federal death penalty by the American public. The author views the Act's
.success" as the potential combination of all three factors.
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prominent-one, for being the only case that an appellate cir-
cuit has issued an opinion affirming a conviction under the
Act;21 the other, for its high profile status and the massive
national and international publicity it generated. 17 Second,
both cases arguably represent situations for which the Federal
Death Penalty Act was truly designed and intended."'
B. United States v. Jones219
[fIn Louis Jones, we had a case that... the [federal death
penalty] statutes contemplated.
On February 18, 1995, United States Air Force Private
Trade McBride was abducted at gunpoint from Goodfellow Air
Force Base in Texas." McBride's ex-husband, Louis Jones
had taken her back to his apartment, tied her up, and placed
her in a closet.' Jones then drove McBride to a remote loca-
tion where he struck her over the head with a tire iron several
times until she was dead.' A subsequent autopsy revealed
evidence that Jones had also sexually assaulted her.
Jones was indicted and charged with kidnapping resulting in
death-a federal crime according to the new provisions of the
Federal Death Penalty Act.' The United States Attorney
prosecuting Jones opted to seek the death penalty and filed the
appropriate notice.' In its notice, the government set forth
216. See infra Part W.B.
217. See infra Part IV.C.
218. See infra Parts IVA, W.B. Note that the fact Congress did not clearly flush
out its own intentions in designing the 1994 Act, see discussion supra Part I, does
not reflect on the accuracy of this statement; the statement must be taken in context.
Public outrage over murder and terrorism provided a major impetus for the 1994
expansion of the federal death penalty. See supra text accompanying note 9. Thus,
crimes involving defendants who committed such acts are the "intended" situations re-
ferred to here.
219. 132 F.3d 232 (5th Cir. 1998).
220. Payne, supra note 181, at IA (statement of Roger McRoberts, lead prosecutor
in the Jones trial).
221. See Jones, 132 F.3d at 237.
222. See id.
223. See id.
224. See 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (1994).
225. See Jones, 132 F.3d at 237.
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four statutory aggravating factors: (1) Jones caused the death
or injury resulting in the death during a kidnapping;' (2)
Jones knowingly created a grave risk of death to one or more
persons in the commission of the crime;' (3) Jones committed
the offense in an especially heinous, cruel, and depraved man-
ner involving torture and serious physical abuse to the vic-
tim;= and (4) Jones substantially planned and premeditated
the murder." The government also added three nonstatutory
factors: (1) the future danger of Jones; (2) the victim's youth,
her slight stature, and her background; and (3) the victim's
personal characteristics and the effect on her family."
Jones submitted several mitigating factors, including his
insignificant prior criminal record, his severe mental and emo-
tional disturbance at the time of the crime, his military service,
and the remorse he felt." After weighing the aggravating and
mitigating factors to determine the propriety of the death pen-
alty, the trial jury found Jones guilty on October 23, 1995, and
returned a unanimous verdict recommending death on Novem-
ber 3, 1995."
After his conviction in the trial court, Jones appealed his
case to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals." In his appeal, he
challenged the constitutionality of the Federal Death Penalty
Act on four grounds: (1) the prosecutor's ability to define non-
statutory aggravating factors amounted to an unconstitutional
delegation of legislative power; (2) the lack of proportionality
review' combined with the prosecutor's unrestrained authori-
ty to allege nonstatutory aggravating factors rendered the stat-
ute unconstitutional; (3) the relaxed evidentiary standard at the
sentencing hearing" combined with the unrestrained use of
226. See 18 U.S.C. § 3592(c)(1); Jones, 132 F.3d at 238 n.1.
227. See 18 U.S.C. § 3592(c)(5); Jones, 132 F.3d at 238 n.1.
228. See 18 U.S.C. § 3592(c)(6); Jones, 132 F.3d at 238 n.1.
229. See 18 U.S.C. § 3592(c)(9); Jones, 132 F.3d at 238 n.1.
230. See Jones, 132 F.3d at 238 n.2.
231. See id. at 239 n.3.
232. See id. at 238-39.
233. See id. at 237.
234. "Proportionality review examines the appropriateness of a sentence for a par-
ticular crime by comparing the gravity of the offense and the severity of the penalty
with sentencing practices in other prosecutions for similar offenses." Id. at 240 (citing
Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 43 (1984)).
235. The Federal Death Penalty Act mandates a relaxed evidentiary standard at
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nonstatutory aggravating factors rendered the jury's recommen-
dation arbitrary; and (4) the unconstitutionality of the death
penalty under all circumstances."5
The court of appeals considered these challenges, along with
other issues raised by Jones, ultimately holding that the sen-
tencing provisions of the Federal Death Penalty Act were con-
stitutional and "that the defendant's death sentence was not
imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other
arbitrary factor."2
7
Before coming to its conclusion, however, the court confronted
each of Jones's four challenges individually. First, the court
found that the delegation of authority to the Department of
Justice to define nonstatutory aggravating factors fell squarely
within the executive branch's broad discretion in deciding
whether to prosecute.' According to the court, therefore,
there was no violation of the nondelegation doctrine of the
Constitution." The court explained that limitations already
exist to guide the prosecution in exercising this authority: the
Federal Death Penalty Act mandates prior notice for all aggra-
vating factors, due process requires that aggravating informa-
tion narrows the class of people eligible for the death penalty,
the trial court can limit admission of useless or prejudicial
information, and the jury must find one statutory factor beyond
a reasonable doubt before it can consider nonstatutory fac-
tors.' The court said that these restrictions ensure preven-
tion of unconstitutional delegation."
Second, the court determined that the Constitution did not
mandate proportionality review as long as the statute in ques-
tion provides for other safeguards to prevent arbitrary imposi-
tion of a death sentence.' The Federal Death Penalty Act,
the sentencing hearing to give the jury an opportunity to hear all relevant informa-
tion, unrestrained by the Federal Rules of Evidence. See 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c) (1994).
236. See Jones, 132 F.3d at 239.
237. Id. at 253.
238. See i- at 239 (citing United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 463-65
(1996)).
239. See U.S. CoNsT. art I, § 1. "All legislative powers herein granted shall be
vested in... Congress...." I&
240. See Jones, 132 F.3d at 239-40 (citations omitted).
241. See id. at 240.
242. See i& at 241.
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the court said, provides the requisite safeguards by limiting the
number of offenses, narrowing the class of eligible defendants
by requiring a finding of one statutory aggravating factor, and
providing for appellate review to ensure that the death sanction
is not imposed under influence of prejudice or arbitrariness.'
Third, the court ruled that the relaxed evidentiary standard
at the sentencing hearing did not effect the reliability of infor-
mation, but rather contributed to accomplishing the sentencing
required by the Constitution.' Writing for the court, Judge
Parker emphasized the importance of the jury receiving suffi-
cient information regarding the defendant in order to make a
proper sentencing determination." s Should the need arise, he
maintained, the district court can prevent any sort of "eviden-
tiary free-for-all... by excluding... information under the
standard enunciated in [18 U.S.C.] § 3593 (c)."'
Finally, in dismissing Jones's fourth challenge, the court cited
the well-documented Supreme Court authority for the proposi-
tion that the death penalty does not violate the Constitution
under all circumstances."
Jones is a landmark for those commentators banking on the
constitutionality of the Act because it was decided by a United
States court of appeals. Thus, an influential federal court has
ratified important aspects of the Federal Death Penalty Act
only three and one-half years after the Act's inception.
243. See id. (citations omitted).
244. See id. at 242 (citing United States v. Nguyen, 928 F. Supp. 1525, 1546-47
(D. Kan. 1996)).
245. See Jones, 132 F.3d at 241 (citing Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 238-39
(1988)).
246. Jones, 132 F.3d at 242.
247. See id. (citing McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 300-03 (1987); Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976)).
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C. The Bombing of the Federal Building in Oklahoma City
[Tihe sheer horror... and... calculating manner of [the
bombing] left little doubt that this was the kind of case that
deserved [the federal death penalty].'
If the Oklahoma City bombing had taken place any time
before September, 1994, Timothy McVeigh may never have had
to worry about the prospect of sitting on death row and, even-
tually, facing death by lethal injection for the brutal crime he
committed on April 19, 1995."4 His was a uniquely federal
crime, involving a federal building and federal employees. Prior
to 1994, the federal capital punishment scheme did not provide
for death to terrorist criminals like McVeigh.25 However, the
Federal Death Penalty Act put an end to this peace of mind
that McVeigh and other federal criminals like him may have
experienced while awaiting sentencing.
On June 13, 1997, in the United States District Court for the
District of Colorado, McVeigh was sentenced to death for his
part in the Oklahoma City bombing." His was the first ter-
rorism case prosecuted under the new federal death penalty
statute to actually proceed to sentencing "McVeigh, sitting
with his elbows on the defense table and his hands clasped in
front of his face, appeared absolutely unshaken by United
States District Court Judge Richard P. Matsch's announcement
of the jury's recommendation that McVeigh die for his
248. Suro, supra note 9, at A14 (paraphrasing statements of United States Justice
Department officials made over the course of the McVeigh trial). Another Justice
official expressed similar sentiments: "[This crime was] so cold and so brutal that [it]
makets] you ask yourself. If not now, then when will you ever ask for the [federal]
death penalty." Id.
249. This statement is made based on the assumption that McVeigh would not be
prosecuted under Oklahoma state law. Oklahoma officials have expressed an interest
in charging McVeigh with state capital crimes, see David E. Rovella, Okla. DA to Try
McVeigh Whatever His Fed Jury Fate; He Says U.S. Law is Flawed; Critics Say Pub-
licity is Goal, NAT'L L.J., June 16, 1997, at A9, but a discussion of whether or not
they could legally do so is beyond the scope of this comment. Oklahoma is one of 38
states with the death penalty. See Kenworthy & Romano, supra note 17 at Al.
250. See discussion of pre-1994 federal death penalties supra Part HL.A.
251. See Kenworthy & Romano, supra note 17, at AL
252. See id.
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crimes."' He may have been the only person unshaken by
the announcement.
Along with most of the families of the victims, federal death
penalty proponents were extremely pleased with the sentence.
McVeigh's crime was precisely the kind of heinous crime the
public majority and many other death penalty proponents had
in mind prior to codification of the 1994 Act.' One United
States Justice Department official commented that "[o]ne could
easily argue that the Oklahoma City bombing case is a national
case and ought to be prosecuted by the federal government
[under the federal death penalty]. " " Most effectively summa-
rized in the simple words of a father of two of the bombing's
victims, "[t]he punishment fit the crime."
During the course of his trial, McVeigh, like Jones, made
several motions challenging various provisions of the Death
Penalty Act. 7 Again, as in Jones, the prosecution was suc-
cessful in blocking substantive constitutional challenges and
garnering favorable holdings from the court.' Most notably,
the court upheld the four statutory aggravating factors identi-
fied in the government notices: (1) death during commission of
another crime; 9 (2) grave risk of death to one or more per-
sons in addition to the victim;' ° (3) substantial planning and
premeditation to cause death or commit an act of terrorism;2"'
and (4) vulnerability of the victims due to old age, youth, and
infirmity.262
253. Id.
254. See Suro, supra note 9, at A14; Cf Pooley, supra note 2, at 31 (noting the
overwhelming support for the death penalty in America).
255. Payne, supra note 181, at 1A (statement of Kevin McNally, attorney with the
Federal Death Penalty Resource Counsel Project in Frankfurt, Kentucky).
256. Kenworthy & Romano, supra note 17, at Al (statement of Jim Denny of
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, whose two children were seriously injured in the bomb-
ing).
257. See, for example, United States v. McVeigh, 944 F. Supp. 1478, 1485-87
(1996), where McVeigh challenged the constitutionality of the use of nonstatutory
aggravating factors by the prosecution and the use of "informatioa" that may be inad-
missible in proving aggravating factors.
258. See id. at 1491.
259. See 18 U.S.C. § 3592(cXl) (1994); McVeigh, 944 F. Supp. at 1488-90.
260. See 18 U.S.C. § 3592(c)(5); McVeigh, 944 F. Supp. at 1490.
261. See 18 U.S.C. § 3592(c)(9); McVeigh, 944 F. Supp. at 1490.
262. See 18 U.S.C. § 3592(cXll); MeVeigh, 944 F. Supp. at 1490-91.
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Unlike Jones, however, a national audience religiously fol-
lowed McVeigh's trial. As a result, the majority of the American
public received their first substantive dose of the workings of
the Federal Death Penalty Act and its practicality in crimes
such as McVeigh's. Critics of the federal death penalty were
surely disquieted by its constitutional sustaining power during
the trial.' Proponents, on the other hand, lauded the fact
that, in a nationally renown trial, successful imposition of the
Federal Death Penalty Act culminated in a sentence of
death.'
V. CONCLUSION
The death penalty has played a prominent role in American
criminal jurisprudence, at both the state and federal levels,
since the earliest days of the republic.2" Despite constitutional
challenges culminating in the brief abolition of the death penal-
ty from 1972 to 1976 ,2  capital punishment ultimately sur-
vived as a sanction for particular criminal behavior. The Su-
preme Court decision in Gregg, combined with strong public
support, put pressure on Congress to revise the federal version
of the death penalty. In 1994, both Congress and the President
responded.27
The Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994, designed and passed
by the 103d Congress of the United States, returned the federal
death penalty to the forefront of American political debate.' s
In addition to serving as a catalyst for debate, however, the Act
has provided a powerful tool for the federal government and the
American people in the battle against violent crime-especially
homicidal acts. Invariably, the Act serves as a mantle of justice
for the families of victims in federal cases such as the Okiaho-
263. Cf Pooley, supra note 2, at 31 (discussing the problem with gauging the
McVeigh case, involving a white mass murderer who enjoyed a $10 million defense,
against typical federal death penalty cases, usually involving poor minority defendants
represented by court appointed attorneys).
264. Cf supra note 248 and accompanying text.
265. See supra Part H.
266. See supra Part H.A-B.
267. See supra Part I.
268. Cf Kaplan, supra note 2, at 28.
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ma City bombing-where the federal death penalty was former-
ly unavailable.
More importantly, however, the Act represents the will of the
citizenry to maintain the death penalty sanction in the United
States. Recent polls show that seventy-five percent of the public
favors the death penalty for individuals convicted of serious
crimes. 2 9 Similarly, Congress, the President, and the courts
are all solidly in favor of capital punishment °.2 " The Act, by
its attempted compliance with constitutional and judicial re-
quirements, responsibly codifies the will of the people at the
federal level and helps bridge the gap between state and feder-
al death penalty jurisprudence. It serves as federal and, more
specifically, Congressional recognition of the strong support for
the death penalty by American voters; and it provides a sort of
federal "stamp of approval" for the continued use of the death
penalty as a criminal sanction within the individual states.
Finally, it is important to acknowledge that both the efficacy
and morality of the death penalty will always be the subject of
some debate. Nevertheless, it would be difficult to deny that the
implementation of the Act, combined with overwhelming public
support for capital punishment, has carved out a significant
place for the federal death penalty in future American criminal
jurisprudence. The recent judicial scrutiny supporting the Act's
constitutionality suggests this effect may be permanent. Future
cases, however, will inevitably present issues that only the
Supreme Court can decide. Until that time, the Act's "success,"
while apparent, will remain relative.
John P. Cunningham*
269. See Pooley, supra note 2, at 31. Sixty-five percent of those polled said they
favored the death penalty for someone convicted of sexually molesting a child, regard-
less of whether the child was killed; 47 percent would authorize the death penalty for
rape convicts. See id.
270. See Pooley, supra note 2, at 31.
* The author would like to thank Amy Arnold, Matt DeVries, Scott Golightly,
and Glenice Coombs for their patience and support throughout the writing and edit-
ing of this article.
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